



Developing the KCL Crisis Simulation

Nick Reynolds

5th September 2018

I am Nick Reynolds, KCL Crisis Team(KCLCT)'s former Head of Operations
Fulfilled that role for 2017 event 'Crisis in Kashmir'
Returned in 2018 to train my replacement; effectively co-Head of Ops with
colleague Will Reynolds (no relation)



KCLCS is an annual event run over a weekend at the War Studies Dept by the Crisis Team


A large political strategic crisis simulation for 50-100 participants divided into committees

Simultaneous multi-domain wargame run by the Ops Team, diplomacy/negotiations component, and media crisis management exercise (run by Media Team, simulating journalists and the press)

I, as Head of the Ops Team, was responsible for the design, build and running of the wargame

Aim – to teach contemporary strategy through ‘active learning’ – learning by doing, known to be effective

Three simultaneous exercise were all somewhat broad-brush, with the simulation designed to explore the complex nature of how these aspects of strategy affect and interact with each other



Participants are generally students

But at all stages; mostly War Studies, IR, Law

45% Military or Government experience

Range - 3 month Internships and reservists to field-grade military officers and intelligence personnel with significant operational experience; generally a land power bias, with exceptions

Mixed-experience group of participants, thrown together and treated with equality

Knowledgeable, but often lacked specific regional or military context for their role

Brought a risk of personality-driven committee dynamics, some strong characters

They could not necessarily provide the context to a simple scenario; we had to provide it, and the scenario had to be more detailed



KCLCS 2017 Crisis in Kashmir

Operations: Built at short notice, therefore rough around the edges; 8 weeks, designed by 2 people, +5 extra on the day (see photo)

I had participated in as a delegate during previous events; never designed a wargame before

When I took over, simulation had functioning media and diplomacy, but wargame intended to underpin this was limited in scope

I wanted to create 'third pillar'; so participants could weight diplomacy and media crisis management with action, or have their actions influence their diplomatic position and strategic communications, rather than just have a negotiation exercise

I was also keen on realism and scenario consistency

Students used to MUN crises where wargaming aspects were poor

Actors – India, Pakistan, USA, China, NSAG

Multiple crises or points of tension that were simulated, to test prioritisation

India-Pakistan Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir

Indian Kashmir counter-insurgency and terrorism

Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Chinese naval exercise in the Indian Ocean (which they could have cancelled to avoid a headache but didn't)

Chinese investment in Pakistan, including the presence of contractors, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative

Wild card NSAG activities - Tehrik-e-Taliban, Baloch separatists, JeM and LeT

Trigger - Humanitarian disaster (flooding) in Srinagar



Some potential crises de-emphasised

Nuclear Proliferation (because this would automatically become a priority)

Anti-piracy off the Somali coast

The Afghan insurgency (because they were of limited relevance)

Manual war-gaming, but KCLCS is computer-assisted

Free Kriegsspiel methodology, initially very pure

Centralised adjudication in the Ops Room to maintain a consistent ground truth

Intelligence based on adjudication would arrive in committee rooms via Google Sheets

An additional scrolling feed

Essential element; precluded us having adjudicators separated and embedded with the committees

Also, Ops Team adjudicators had different fields of expertise; allowed us to constantly confer and work deliver the best outcomes

'Fill the room with experts, who then go on 'best guess' ' -a friend at RUSI

Wargame was fairly conventional, with some exceptions:

No rounds, no explicit limit on the number of orders, no artificial constraints on player behaviour; accelerated game-clock

This was to create sense of time pressure and to deliberately induce stress

Experience – seen wargames ask participants to behave realistically, but I had seen this go wrong with MUN; Adjudicators preventing ‘out of character’ actions that were actually within the bounds of realistic or defensible interpretation, lack of research or blinkered opinion

My aim: test ability to frame strategic problems and prioritise; obvious constraints run counter to this aim.

Hoped-for behaviour: committees re-conceptualising strategic problems in innovative ways that would confer unexpected advantages

Freedom creates Immersion in scenario, immersion in character, and sense of agency, influence, and power

Constraints would be inappropriate

Therefore, Ops Team policy:

Ops Team never said ‘No’; reasons for actions not being feasible were always given in-scenario, always treated as an opportunity to provide context and background information

If it was within the authority of a character to order something (and some were authoritarian regimes, so had a lot of authority), and if they insisted against our advice, then Ops would allow orders to go through and allow them to blunder

We would also attempt to play it out realistically, rather than just punishing them with a worst-case outcome

Participant Orders:

- 1) Which delegates are ordering/authorising this mission?
- 2) Units (which units do you wish to issue this order to?)
-included military units, civil assets and intelligence agencies
- 3) Situation
- 4) Intent/Policy Goals
- 5) Mission and Concept of Operations
- 6) Time Of or Trigger For Initiation
(orders could be conditional)
- 7) Operational Limitations and Control Measures

Ways-ends-means-
constraints

An element of guidance instead built into Orders system

Basically we tried to guide them into a Ends-Ways-Means-Constraints model of thought

Opportunity to exercise Mission Command or to Micro-manage
Sometimes micro-focus was important and had to be facilitated

“Drowning in data, starved for information.”

Scenario delivery done via Intelligence

Famous quote; we adopted it as policy

Different rooms, remote delivery of intel, media environment already naturally creates *friction* and *fog of war*

We compounded this with minor distortion of committee’s information gathering

Stylised delivery

By example, US would have good technical gathering and wide variety of sources but variable HUMINT that would sometimes fail

Other states might have difficulty gathering foreign intel but have good internal security intelligence

Data vs noise adds realism and flavour/immersion

1	Time	Subject	Recipient	Source	Type	Estimative Probability	Intelligence
12	25/02/2017, 1000hrs	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	19th Infantry Division, XV Corps	HUMINT		19th Infantry Division, XV Corps: HQ in Srinagar flooded, serious damage to facilities and equipment. Division G3 Officer has taken command; General Officer Commanding unaccounted for, Div 2IC 'hysterically weeping in his office'. Many citizens seeking assistance.
13	25/02/2017, 1000hrs	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	28th Mountain Division, XV Corps	HUMINT		Flooding reported in unit Area of Operations. Large numbers of displaced civilians reporting that they have been left homeless. Division G2 assesses that 15,000 are without shelter.
14	25/02/2017, 1015hrs	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	Ministry of Civil Aviation	HUMINT/GEOINT		Any remaining flight bans lifted
15	10:30	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	19th Infantry Division, XV Corps	HUMINT		19th Inf Div G3 Officer: Large numbers of soldiers from 19th Inf Div reported missing or have not returned to duty; others are overwhelmed providing assistance to those citizens in their immediate vicinity. Division is combat ineffective.
16	10:30	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	J&K State Government	HUMINT		River Jehlum overflowed banks and burst levees; Uri partially flooded, power outages reported. Local roads impassable.
17	10:57	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	29th Infantry Div	HUMINT		29th Inf Div advance units are moving to Srinagar. Congestion and flood damage to the roads. No ETA yet.
18	25/02/2017, 1100hrs	OPERATION (Jammu & Kashmir, Line of Control)	DG MI; DG DIA; DG BSF	Army; BSF	ASINT		Intelligence on Pakistani Air Defences - no change from previous assessments. Air defence units dispersed and difficult to locate, but known to be present. Estimated ZERO freedom of movement over Pakistani airspace by Indian Air Force.
19	1100	J&K; Flooding	DG RR	CIF Kilo, Rashtriya Rifles	HUMINT		A 'dam of animal carcasses' is blocking the river at Sopore

We took a story-telling, prose approach

Aim: Vignettes

Intel feed would cover condensed reports (official and unofficial) from subordinates, which might or might not be irrelevant strategically e.g. Accurate information on IDPs and infrastructure damage blended with trivia about livestock and the psychological state of mid-level bureaucrats

All in-character or in-scenario apart from the grid references included.

It would also include some limited analysis or advice to give participants a steer, especially if they were going wrong in our opinion

Breaking immersion occurs when:

- Wargame grinds to a halt
- Orders catastrophically misinterpreted by Ops in a manner perceived as unrealistic
- Outcomes perceived as unrealistic
- Participants feel unrealistically constrained

Problems identified and what we did to make improvements for KCLCS 2018

Immersion a key aim and litmus test of success or failure:

Did well on military outcomes, post-simulation analysis with RUSI MilSci backed this up; but problems with Free Kriegsspiel (to be covered later)

Only a few orders mis-interpreted due to speed-reading

Intentional time-pressure a double-edged sword

Nobody felt unrealistically constrained – a success!

Fortunately, we avoided wargame grinding to a halt – at times narrowly, due to informatics/IT issues



When running a wargame, small design problems can become big delivery problems
I saw this photo after the event and realised from my body language how stressed I must have been!

Technical problems; comparatively easy fixes
Physical A0 paper mapping based on satellite imagery worked well; good for spatial awareness


1	Time	Subject	Recipient	Source	Type	Estimative Probability	Intelligence
12	25/02/2017, 1000hrs	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	19th Infantry Division, XV Corps	HUMINT		19th Infantry Division, XV Corps: HQ in Srinagar flooded, serious damage to facilities and equipment. Division G3 Officer has taken command; General Officer Commanding unaccounted for, Div 2IC 'hysterically weeping in his office'. Many citizens seeking assistance.
13	25/02/2017, 1000hrs	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	28th Mountain Division, XV Corps	HUMINT		Flooding reported in unit Area of Operations. Large numbers of displaced civilians reporting that they have been left homeless. Division G2 assesses that 15,000 are without shelter.
14	25/02/2017, 1015hrs	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	Ministry of Civil Aviation	HUMINT/GEOINT		Any remaining flight bans lifted
15	10:30	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	19th Infantry Division, XV Corps	HUMINT		19th Inf Div G3 Officer: Large numbers of soldiers from 19th Inf Div reported missing or have not returned to duty; others are overwhelmed providing assistance to those citizens in their immediate vicinity. Division is combat ineffective.
16	10:30	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	J&K State Government	HUMINT		River Jehlum overflowed banks and burst levees; Uri partially flooded, power outages reported. Local roads impassable.
17	10:57	J&K; Flooding	DG MI; DG DIA	29th Infantry Div	HUMINT		29th Inf Div advance units are moving to Srinagar. Congestion and flood damage to the roads. No ETA yet.
18	25/02/2017, 1100hrs	OPERATION (Jammu & Kashmir, Line of Control)	DG MI; DG DIA; DG BSF	Army; BSF	ASINT		Intelligence on Pakistani Air Defences - no change from previous assessments. Air defence units dispersed and difficult to locate, but known to be present. Estimated ZERO freedom of movement over Pakistani airspace by Indian Air Force.
19	1100	J&K; Flooding	DG RR	CIF Kilo, Rashtriya Rifles	HUMINT		A 'dam of animal carcasses' is blocking the river at Sopore

Informatics mostly an easy fix, better use of tech and a little bit of scripting meant that all operational orders or intelligence requests from all committees arrived sequentially in one place

Timestamp	Subject	Recipient	Type/Source	Intelligence
Starting scenario	Yemeni Civil War; Siege of Taizz	Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	HUMINT from Saudi military advisers in Yemen.	The Yemeni 19th Infantry Brigade, 14th Armoured Brigade, and 314th Infantry Brigade are being besieged in Taizz (Alpha Yankee 0-7-9) by Houthi forces consisting of three militia brigades and traitor Brigade 135. Yemeni forces hold approx 60% of the city, gradually losing ground to Houthi assaults. Surrounding Yemeni forces are attempting to lift the siege. Houthi forces are present north of Taizz (Alpha Yankee 0-7-8), providing a porous screen partially protecting their siege troops. Small numbers of Saudi military advisors (including a handful of armoured vehicle crews) are present in Taizz providing direct assistance in combat.
Starting scenario	Yemeni Civil War; Air Campaign	Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	RSAF Wing 11	Air strikes continue to be launched against Houthi positions in Yemen. A primary target are Houthi forces in and around Taizz (Alpha Yankee 0-7-9), as well as those in Sa'naa (Alpha Zulu 0-7-5) and Sadah (Alpha Yankee 0-7-2).
1013	Yemeni Civil War; Siege of Taizz	Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	HUMINT from Saudi military advisers in Yemen.	The commanders of the Yemeni 19th and 314th Infantry Brigades have been reprimanded for engaging in a fist-fight during the daily Orders Group.
1024	Yemeni Civil War; Siege of Taizz	Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	HUMINT from Saudi military advisers in Yemen.	The Yemeni 19th Infantry Brigade has lost three city blocks in central Taizz to Houthi forces, the most significant territorial loss in several weeks. Morale in 19th Infantry Brigade is assessed as LOW. The morale amongst the rest of the Yemeni defenders is assessed as being MODERATE. Houthi gains are considered to have been costly, with an estimated 60 Houthi militia casualties. In addition, the commander of the Yemeni 314th Infantry Brigade is rumoured to have been reprimanded for excessive risk-taking activity, in particular for personally disposing of unexploded Houthi mortars by hand.

We also simplified intel delivery

The only unresolved technical issue was that of lag in Google Sheets



Better informatics allowed us to add a data capture element

KCLCS2018 – dual purpose forms

Firstly, used Orders forms to guide participants in their strategic discussion; trimmed the orders forms to make them more user-friendly with four essential questions

Forcing participants to ask the right questions of themselves as they assembled their actions

Secondly, in the absence of scribes and since we didn't want to record deliberations, forcing them to articulate why they were doing what they were doing gave us a body of data

Getting people to articulate the situation and/or policy goals, even with a moderator in the room, was difficult at times, usually to do with time pressure

E Situation:	F Intent/Policy Goals:	Miss
<p>Saudi Arabia is acting as a giant cock in the ME and <u>need to be set in place</u> Their monarchy is against the ideals of Islam</p>	<p>Destabilize Saudi Arabia with multiple dilemmas happening simultaneously, utilizing many covert channels that we've cultivated</p>	<p>Radi Saud viol expe hous with proje Irania Riva</p>

Other times it could sum things up wonderfully and give us great insight into committee's mindset at a particular point!
(Example from Iranian committee, KCLCS 2018)

Pure *Free Kriegsspiel* is inappropriate for complex scenarios



The problem with pure *Free Kriegsspiel*

KCLCS 2017 – Filled the room with experts, and went on best guess
Or took intelligent people with moderate professional and academic experience,
made them do enough focused research that they could effectively be experts

Experts make mistakes

Experts forget things

Experts get tunnel vision

Experts mis-remember facts

Conventional operations produce results for the participants to
receive or digest; relatively simple

Influence operations, counter-insurgency operations requiring HN support,
operations with overt and covert elements

These will manifest in numerous ways, some of which may be delayed,
incremental, or resulted in a series of effects from a single trigger, and appear
different from the viewpoint of different actors.

Manifestation in KCLCS 2017

Impact of participant actions upon the civilian population was
haphazard

Some second and third order effects that should have happened

did not due to time pressure

Head of Ops nearly had a heart attack

Therefore for KCLCS 2018 we brought in a greater element of
process

Not to guide outcomes, but to checklist points to draw out, and to
ensure that we didn't miss things

- (1) Does the operation have a clear mission and political goal/intent articulated or not? Is the mission and goal/intent realistic?
- (2) Is the operation feasible given the physical and human geography of the Area of Operations (AO)?
- (3) Is the operation feasible given basing and logistics capacity available?
- (4) Have sufficient resources, combat and combat support units/personnel been allocated to the operation? Or, has the operation been resourced correctly? Are the units and resources of the right type and qualitative standard to succeed given the type of operation that they will be conducting?
- (5) How will the operation impact on enemies, allies and civilians?
- (6) How will the operation appear to journalists and other observers?

Basically, is the plan thought through? Is it feasible? Is it properly resourced given its goals? What secondary and tertiary effects will there be?

Discrepancies and shortfalls between the orders received and the Operations Team's analysis/assessment of the situation could determine in what ways the operation would go to plan and in what ways it would fail. In this way, a nuanced outcome with multiple knock-on effects in different domains could be generated



In 2017, multiple points of tension worked well; participants balancing and trading off

We accentuated this in KCLCS2018


Contemporary air and, in particular, naval issues not understood well – can be counterintuitive

Participants understood Kilcullen, Mao, Clausewitz, Foucault, Derrida, Thucydides...

a keen understanding (from a realist perspective) of their state's interests...
but don't understand how these actually manifest through practical action
Results could superficially appear bizarre



We reached out and received help; experience of what participants allowed us to ask the right questions; generous pro-bono support from RUSI MilSci and Jane's allowed us to understand dynamics that are difficult to understand and model if you are only relying on easily accessible open sources.



From our data we also found that the scenario wasn't quite achieving what we hoped.

We looked at the orders issued by committees

The subtle erosion of legitimacy, international support and soft power not recognised by participants

War Studies can be very realist;

Also probably something to do with zeitgeist of the Trump era;

Simulating plummeting public approval ratings in the intelligence feed failed to have a restraining impact (perhaps realistic?)

In sim, international law and the UN were side-lined


Despite some people with MUN or real UN background!

Both a lack of understanding of law and UN, and also an underlying 'structural realist' belief that the international system is anarchic, and both the UN and international law are toothless

This isn't explicitly articulated, but evident from actions

It is a prevalent viewpoint in some parts of academia, but we didn't want to promote it.

We had to look at ways of imposing costs.



Other issues we noticed

Participants were generally approaching the scenario in the right way and asking many of the right questions

However, some participants took heavy-handed measures, while others under-reacted

Participants could be unrealistically oversensitive or under-sensitive to different events

At the most extreme, they would enter the scenario and find the stable status quo to be unbearable

Scenario-building: in order to keep the discussions at the right level, we had to overemphasise or underemphasise some details accordingly

Contextualising was not enough

A useful teaching point; in real life, some actors have a surprisingly high tolerance for pain or unexpected sensitivities

Example:

KCLCS 2017 – the Kashmir Line of Control routinely sees a high level of violence
Yet while we stressed the baseline level from the start, we found that we had to scale it down to about 25% of the real number of cross-border incursions or

terrorist incidents before we got an appropriate level of restraint and considered response from the Pakistan and India committees

Great from an analytical point of view, highlights areas of public policy making that are routinely or systematically misunderstood


However, this needed to be countered to ensure that we had a more balanced and realistic simulation

This consideration influenced the style of intelligence delivery

Therefore, (1) outcomes from adjudication had to be very carefully balanced and (2) qualified with information stating *why* that outcome occurred, including explicitly stating points of ambiguity – e.g. ‘this event occurred, it is unknown why or who is responsible’

Intel had to be longer. 3-5 lines, as opposed to 1-3.

Burden upon the Ops Team, but we made up for this with the informatics improvements



KCLCS2018

Israel, US, Saudi Arabia, Iraqi Government, Iraqi Shia Militias, Iran (including Houthi and Hezb. Reps.)

Scenario started with an initial crisis to provide a primary challenge that would affect all committees

Primary challenge built into the scenario

- How might regional actors respond to an oil tanker hijacking that threatened to block or succeeded in blocking the Strait of Hormuz

The King's Crisis Times

Shockingly Real. Simulating Geopolitics for Academic Purposes.

News

About the Simulation

Reuters: BREAKING! Oil tanker Hawtah has detonated

February 24, 2018



An oil slick has been released from the Hawtah and has contaminated the coast of both Oman and the UAE. There is a high probability that the coast of Iran will be contaminated in the coming weeks and months. The probable economic is difficult to assess at this stage, but will be high. Parts of the oil slick are on fire. The Strait of Hormuz is assessed as being only partially navigable. This is likely to cause an ecological disaster.

We picked a real Saudi-flagged oil tanker, for realism;
It did end up causing an oil spill after the participants accidentally blew it up
This organically drove unscripted events for the rest of the sim

Secondary pre-established challenges built into the scenario

- How can Iraq control its Shia militias and balance Iranian and American influence?
- How might Iraq's Shia militias use their highly autonomous status and exploit their increased power in Iraqi affairs after the defeat of ISIS?
- How might Iran overcome its international isolation?
- How will Iran maximise its regional influence via its use of proxies?
- How could Saudi Arabia respond, should conservative and progressive elements within its society become increasingly polarised and cause civil unrest?
- How will Saudi Arabia balance its response to a new regional crisis with its ongoing involvement in the Yemeni Civil War and the Shia unrest in the Eastern Province?
- How will Israel exploit an isolationist Trump administration unconcerned with human rights in its dealings with its neighbours, particularly Hezbollah?
- How will the United States understand the situation and order its priorities in the Middle East after the defeat of ISIS?

Secondary pre-established challenges built into the scenario

That's there for interest only; I can summarise the important parts:

- Spreading Iranian and PMF influence in an unstable Iraq and Syria
- The Yemeni Civil War
- Most significantly, both progressive and conservative unrest in Saudi Arabia hypothetically occurring at the same time

In both the Yemeni Civil War and Saudi unrest, we tailored the scenario to provide enough information for the participants to determine that the situation was fundamentally containable but details that could lead them to come to a worst-case scenario interpretation of events

To balance playability and realism

Scenario slightly favoured Iran, who were otherwise at a disadvantage due to isolation

No internal unrest at this time

Defensible decision; a security state where unrest is effectively prevented


Saudis heavily tested, due to their sovereign wealth and network of allies

Oil-wealth makes Saudi Arabia less accountable to its population, and its well-equipped military, strong allies and deep pockets meant that it could throw resources at problems

US, Israel inserted or insert themselves into the scenario

Iraq a probable battleground; difficult for the Iraqis


Based on experience with China in KCLCS, we knew that the scenario would need to be carefully crafted to facilitate US and Israeli involvement



This is what we adjudicated

To clarify, I was aiming for volume, to provide a rich environment, and to test intelligence and information comprehension

Started off the scenario with pre-scripted hijacking scenario, then shifted to unscripted or predicted contingencies (based on testing and past experience whgihc drew out likely courses of action) as committee decisions and actions increasingly drove events



Most events (300+) were completely unscripted, despite the large body (240, of which less than half were used) of predicted contingencies and 57 scripted events that initiated the scenario

Testing was invaluable to this

The realism was better, and there were only a few screw-ups; only one piece of research failure that we were called out on

We weren't aware of the Saudi capability to independently gather satellite imagery, and a participant pointed out that they are

A minor issue

The King's Crisis Times

Shockingly Real. Simulating Geopolitics for Academic Purposes.

News

About the Simulation

Reuters: Lebanese singer in Twitter rage, amid renewed criticism of Israeli air strikes

February 25, 2018

Nancy Ajram has taken to Twitter to criticize recent Israeli actions. IAF air strikes in Tyre resulted in civilian casualties. Lebanese Twitter has been emboldened, and renewed criticism of Israeli actions in many Arab countries. Ajram is a famous Lebanese singer.



We had identified the most difficult or time-consuming things to adjudicate from KCLCS2017 Crisis in Kashmir

Population; environmental disaster, riots, unrest, popular dissatisfaction, protests, insurgency, terrorism

These things have an ebb and flow and, once started, develop incrementally and are rarely concluded quickly

Also manifest in multiple ways and impact on different stakeholders
State infrastructure and public services, law enforcement, military, intelligence/internal security services all impacted in different ways



Didn't run these as scripted events; we had 'if... then...' conditional triggers which we had already decided upon, and the contingencies were malleable
Many of these were to do with public relations backlash, and tied to constraining behaviour in-scenario (as mentioned earlier)

Why Nancy Ajram?

Because the Ops Team spent the most effort constraining US or Israeli behaviour, given their capabilities.

We had to get creative; previous methods of imposing costs had failed

Millennial audience actually very receptive to social media pressure!



Source: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Foreign travel advice, Lebanon

<https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/lebanon>

Worried about excessive air power

Remember, delegates could be heavy-handed, and US/Israeli committee conventional capabilities were actually sufficient to allow them to take problematic courses of action)

They would not do these in real life because of political cost

Modelling that political cost very difficult; simulation risked validating neo-conservative/hawkish theories of unipolarity

We wanted to avoid this

For example, if Israeli airstrikes passed a certain threshold and ceased to discriminate between areas of conflict and areas that are generally deemed safe to travel in an area where tourist destinations are an hour's drive away from warzones.

The King's Crisis Times

Shockingly Real. Simulating Geopolitics for Academic Purposes.

News

About the Simulation

Reuters: Tom Hardy dies in IAF air strikes on Tyre

February 24, 2018

It has been reported that British actor Tom Hardy was killed during the recent hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, after Israel launched strikes against the popular tourist destination of Tyre. Reuters previously reported the civilian casualties after the IAF air strikes on Tyre, Lebanon.

Hardy, 40, was holidaying in the Lebanon with his family after filming wrapped on his upcoming film 'Venom'. He had delayed leaving the country for unknown reasons despite local British Embassy staff having released an informal travel advisory as the prospect of hostilities loomed. Hardy's small entourage was belatedly attempting to reach a nearby local airport for an emergency flight home before becoming caught up in a series of Israeli airstrikes targeting military vehicles transiting the main highway.



Hardy is survived by his wife Charlotte Riley and two children, who had safely returned to the UK the night before.

The Israeli Air Force has become the most-abused profile on Twitter in a 24-hour period, while their Facebook page no longer appears to be operational after a rumoured hack. #RIPTomHardy is still the top trend on Twitter despite, or perhaps because of, the unfolding instability in the Middle East having grabbed global attention.

Element of controversial dark comedy crept in that wouldn't be funny in real life, but we had found we need to exaggerate otherwise, strategically, the costs weren't there

A calculated but justifiable risk that paid off!

With context, careful wording and calibrated events to maintain realism/plausibility, we consistently found that we got good results from this


Some people laughed, some people shocked

Either way:

People genuinely embarrassed when their actions had this consequence

It increased immersion

Note: Be sparing with dark comedy



If there's time...

Findings (in brief) that we need to address in future re-development

Dilemmas, intent, policies

People bad at framing these

Incrementalism or 'muddling through' is common

Sometimes participants would identify a policy-dilemma, but couldn't choose

Passed the responsibility downstream; issued orders with contradictory imperatives

Sometimes they would realise that restraint was best, and exercise it

Sometimes they would come up with something innovative

Or crazy

Moderators must be aware of this and focus participants on planning

Politicians using Fake News

If you blast others with propaganda, it makes it hard to politically signal when you really need to

Particularly tying actions with words
Fake news is a bad idea

Thank you for your time.